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Abstract
In 1979, New Orleans’ Mardi Gras celebration was disrupted by a police strike. The
strike exposed the new political positioning that had resulted from national pressures such as the
realization of black political power and the brief surge in public worker unions. New Orleans’
weakening white social elite was forced to assert its remaining power through Mardi Gras, while
finding an unexpected ally in Mayor Ernest N. Morial, the first black mayor of New Orleans.
This temporary alliance exemplifies an experience that was different than that of other American
cities. While strong racial tension persisted, the old establishment’s interests coincided with
Mayor Morial’s when Mardi Gras, a powerful cultural and economic institution, was threatened.
This temporary alliance managed to defeat the local police union by galvanizing the citizens of
the city against the strikers.

New Orleans; Mardi Gras; police; union; strike; Morial
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Introduction
“It’s Alive! It’s Alive!” a banner headline proclaimed in the February 28, 1979, New
Orleans The Times-Picayune. The front page reminded readers that, although New Orleans’
major Mardi Gras parades had stayed off of the streets throughout the carnival season, Mardi
Gras had not disappeared entirely.1 The 1979 iteration of the city’s famous pre-Lenten
celebration had certainly been abnormal. Most years, locals and visitors would have enjoyed
weeks of parades before ostensibly giving up indulgence during the Catholic observance of Lent.
However, New Orleans’ Mardi Gras had developed beyond its Catholic roots into a major tourist
attraction. Local boosters called Mardi Gras “the greatest free show on earth,” and organizations,
called krewes, often touted their parades as gifts to the public. By the late 1970s, the carnival
season had developed into a lucrative source of income for hotels, restaurants, and other touristoriented service industries. Away from public view, krewes also held lavish balls for the
members’ friends and families, though most people’s carnival season centered upon public
activity—the parades, carousing, and costuming. But on Mardi Gras Day in 1979, the Baton
Rouge Advocate quipped that the “most popular costumes in the French Quarter in the early
hours of Mardi Gras Tuesday were the green fatigues and riot helmets of National Guardsmen.”2
The National Guard, and a few people who jokingly costumed as soldiers, patrolled the streets of
the French Quarter along with Louisiana State Police because, with few exceptions, the officers
of the New Orleans Police Department did not. The Police Association of New Orleans (PANO)
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Molly Moore, “It’s Alive! It’s Alive!,” The Times-Picayune, February 28, 1979.
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had called a strike several days earlier, casting the annual celebration into uncertainty as PANO
leadership and Mayor Ernest N. “Dutch” Morial attempted to stare each other down.3

Figure 1. Revelers on Bourbon Street on Mardi Gras Day followed by National Guards on patrol.
AP photo, The Baton Rouge Advocate, February 28, 1979.

The strike affected nearly everyone because the city’s financial well-being relied heavily
on revenue from the tourist industry. However, the strike’s implications stretched beyond
business and leisure. The first cancellation of major parades since the Korean War spotlighted a
transitional period in New Orleans’ power relations as the black community’s political weight
strengthened while white elites were losing control of the city’s government amidst a dwindling
white population. The weakening of long-standing political forces meant that several new groups
competed for influence in the city, including Morial, traditional black political organizations,
and, at least in the opinion of some people, national unions.

3

Occasionally, officials referred to PANO by its original name, the Patrolmen’s Association of New Orleans,
instead of Police Association. It is also occasionally referred to as the Police Association of Louisiana. For clarity,
this paper will use the Police Association of Louisiana.
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This paper will explore the strike’s political ramifications in a rapidly shifting urban
arena. The strike was evidence of an exceptional pattern of urban political growth after the
advent of black municipal power in the United States. While it was not unheard of for the
interests of black mayors and white elites to coincide, the police strike and the importance of
Mardi Gras led to an uncommon relationship between a new black mayor, Morial, and old social
elites as well as business leaders. Instead of holding to racial lines, the established white social
elite aligned briefly with Morial against a mostly white police force. This is not to suggest a
period of racial harmony. In fact, Morial and wealthy white elites would clash over other issues
later in Morial’s mayoralty. The strike temporarily aligned Morial with the interests of those at
the top of the rigid social structure of New Orleans. Opposite this temporary alliance were the
unionized police, whose strike experience echoes the undoing of public unions along racial and
bureaucratic lines that organized labor experienced throughout the country. The strike exposes
the new alignment of local political power in which the established white elites were forced use
alternate avenues to assert power while acknowledging surging African-American political
power while public unionism was cast aside.
This story will primarily be told using newspapers, letters to Mayor Morial’s office, and
interviews as primary sources. The newspapers consulted most frequently are the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, the largest newspaper in New Orleans in 1979 which often reflected the
conservative views of the New Orleans establishment, and the Figaro, an alternative weekly
newspaper which spent more time covering the police unions’ view. Iris Kelso, who had a
complicated and sometimes adversarial relationship with Morial, wrote many of the political
news articles for Figaro. The Louisiana Weekly, which was significant in the African-American
community, the New York Times, and other newspapers, provided less extensive coverage of the

3

events. The letters and telegrams featured in this paper were sent to the mayor during the strike
and are now kept in the Mayor Ernest N. Morial Records collection at the New Orleans Public
Library. Finally, two main sets of interviews consulted: interviews with Dutch Morial conducted
by Arnold Hirsch as part of his personal research, and interviews conducted after Morial’s death
by University of New Orleans professors and students for a project called Contemporary New
Orleans: An Oral History Project Concerning Ernest N. “Dutch” Morial.
Transitional periods were not uncommon throughout cities in the United States during the
1960s and 70s. Historian Jeffrey Adler argues that this period saw a realization of African
American political power, brought on by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which “produced a sea
change in urban society.”4 Much has been written about the history of first black mayors in
major American cities, such as Richard Hatcher in Gary, Indiana; Harold Washington in
Chicago, Illinois; and Carl Stokes in Cleveland, Ohio. Mayors of all races and ethnicities had to
deal with the problems of shrinking tax bases and national economic decline, but Adler
concludes that black mayors faced special challenges as they dealt with racism within local and
state governments. Historian Roger Biles echoes Adler’s assertion that black mayors faced
additional challenges noting that as whites left the inner city, they took tax revenue and years of
work expertise with them which left city services in shambles.5
Because some cities that elected their first black mayors were still majority white, uneasy
political alliances were not uncommon. For example, Maynard Jackson had to consider the
interests of Atlanta’s white business leaders while also attempting to improve conditions in the
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Jeffrey Adler, introduction to African American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the American City, ed. David Colbrun
and Jeffrey Adler, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 1.
5
Roger Biles, “Black Mayors: A Historical Assessment,” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 77, No. 3 (1992), 115.
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city’s impoverished black neighborhoods, according to historian Ronald Bayor.6 But Atlanta
featured a different political landscape than New Orleans. Historian Bernard Rice places
business leaders at the top of the power structure in Atlanta, an arrangement which he argues
meant that decisions on desegregation were made with “business pragmatism” in mind.7 While
business interests certainly existed, New Orleans’ power structure was more heavily influenced
by a group of social elites which drew its legitimacy more from lineage than business success.
Tulane University economics professor Charles Y. W. Chai identified this arrangement of power
as a major source of New Orleans’ stagnation, both economically and socially.8 These elites
would not be so easily lured by the prosperity of other Sunbelt cities; to them, the possibility of
New Orleans becoming like Atlanta or Houston might even be seen as a threat.
Also, as Morial did, many black mayors struggled with their police departments. In
Cleveland, Mayor Carl Stokes clashed with police over the reform of the police recruitment
process, which was designed to bring more African Americans into the overwhelmingly white
police force; in an especially tense moment during a riot, some Cleveland police officers even
used racial slurs in reference to Stokes on the police radio.9 Reforming police departments was
important because the police had so often been symbols of repression to the black community,
but also because police violence and corruption reflected poorly on cities in the eyes of business
interests. In short, there was strong pressure to reform law enforcement.
Historians of this national political shift have tended to focus their studies on cities such
as Cleveland, Gary, Detroit, and Chicago, leaving New Orleans understudied. Historian Arnold
6

Ronald Bayor, “African-American Mayors in Atlanta,” in African American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the
American City, 181.
7
Bradley R. Rice, “If Dixie Were Atlanta,” in Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II, eds. Richard
M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 47-48.
8
Charles Y. W. Chai, “Who Rules New Orleans? A Study of Community Power Structure,” Louisiana Business
Survey 2 (October 1971): 11.
9
Leonard N. Moore, Carl Stokes of Cleveland in African American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the American City,
94-95.
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Hirsch’s research demonstrates that Morial’s struggles in office reflected many of the
experiences of other pioneering African American mayors. Hirsch, an urban historian initially
trained as an expert in Chicago’s politics, has written about Morial in several articles, as well as
in the book he co-edited, Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization. Hirsch contends that,
while there were some similarities shared by Morial and other African American mayors,
Morial’s distinctly Creole vision of local society’s racial structure played an important role in his
impact on New Orleans politics. In the radical Creole intellectual tradition, Hirsch says, Morial
“pursued neither black separatism nor chauvinism but a single society, open to all.”10 The radical
Creole outlook, according to historians Caryn Cossé Bell and Joseph Logsdon, was rooted in
French intellectualism and in the “revolutionary movements in the nineteenth-century French
world.”11 Nikki Dugar argues in her MA thesis that, during the Civil Rights Movement, some
creoles embraced an isolationist “creole” identity while some others, civil rights lawyer A.P.
Tureaud included, embraced a “black” identity.12
New Orleans’ social and economic problems were interconnected. In the controversial
report The New Orleans Economy: Pro Bono Publico?, University of New Orleans Economics
Professor James Bobo identified major problems of the New Orleans economy. He argued that
New Orleans’ sluggish growth had to do with the huge gap between the city’s upper class and its
vast impoverished population.13 This, Bobo said, created a separate “underworld” economy
marked by low levels of education, extreme underemployment, and abject poverty, which was
not affected by conventional economic development. In short, Bobo argued that these factors
10

Arnold Hirsch, “Simply a Matter of Black and White,” in Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization ed.
Arnold Hirsch and Joe Logsdon (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1992), 305.
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Joseph Logsdon and Caryn Cossé Bell, “The Americanization of Black New Orleans,” in Creole New Orleans:
Race and Americanization ed. Arnold Hirsch and Joe Logsdon (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1992), 203-204.
12
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thesis, the University of New Orleans, 2009), 32.
13
James Bobo, The New Orleans Economy: Pro Bono Publico? (New Orleans: The University of New Orleans,
1975), 2-3.
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exacerbated and perpetuated New Orleans’ existing economic problems. Writing a few years
earlier, Tulane University Economics Professor Charles Y. W. Chai’s report “Who Rules New
Orleans?” found that New Orleans’ rigid social structure, which was difficult to break into
because it relied on carefully cultivated pedigree not wealth, led to economic stagnation and
social problems.14 These reports were taken seriously by some of New Orleans’ leaders in the
1970’s and ‘80’s, though some in the business community dismissed their findings as negative
thinking and developed publicity campaigns focused on positive news about the economy. Some
politicians, especially Morial, used these reports as evidence of the need to restructure the city’s
political and economic institutions.
Labor relations formed another important theme of the 1979 strike. In Stayin’ Alive: The
1970’s and the Last Days of the Working Class, historian Jefferson Cowie illustrated that 1970’s
was a tumultuous decade for organized labor. It began, he writes, with the “promise of workingclass revival,” but ended with the demise of working class solidarity.15 Similarly, labor historian
Joseph McCartin argues that the mid-70’s saw a turn for the worse for public sector unions,
which had experienced a massive upsurge in activity in the 1960’s and early 1970’.16 Though
public sector strikes had gained legitimacy in courts and with the public in the early 1970’s,
McCartin says public unions were forced into taking unpopular action as they attempted to
protect their members from the effects of national financial crisis. This period has been
understudied in the context of Louisiana, but what has been written does seem to follow along

14

Charles Y. W. Chai, “Who Rules New Orleans?,” 11.
Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970’s and the Last Days of the Working Class, (New York: The New Press,
2010), 18.
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McCartin’s work also contains a detailed account of the important legislation and judicial decisions that
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2009), 211-213.
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the same lines. In Louisiana Labor: From Slavery to Right-to-Work, Bernard Cook and James
Watson argue that the latter half of the 1970’s was a difficult time for organized labor because
Louisiana had a strong anti-labor movement embodied by the Louisiana Association of Business
and Industry (LABI).17 Governor Edwin Edwards, who had received support from unions in his
gubernatorial campaigns, sensed the growth of anti-union sentiment and allowed anti-union
“Right-to-Work” legislation to be passed in 1976.18
All of these different currents collided during the 1979 police strike, a pivotal moment in
Dutch Morial’s tenure in office, but little has been written about it.19 One master’s thesis by
Preston C. Rodrigue, argues that the administration successfully used paramilitary force to break
the strike.20 Viewing the strike through the lens of military history, Rodrigue argues that the city
“won” the strike because it successfully developed and implemented a well-organized plan while
PANO’s disorganization doomed its efforts. Frank Bovenkirk has also written about the strike in
a short article.21 Bovenkirk downplays the racial tension that the strike evoked and argues that
the strike was mostly about money. The strike also generated interest from legal scholars because
it produced a significant ruling in Louisiana labor law which held that public employees had no
right to strike.22 Neither military nor legal history is the focus of this thesis, which explores the
strike’s political ramifications in a changing urban arena.

17

Bernard Cook and James R. Watson, Louisiana Labor: From Slavery To “Right to Work,” (Lanham, MD: The
University Press of America, 1985), 296.
18
Bernard Cook and James R. Watson, Louisiana Labor: From Slavery To “Right to Work,” 298.
19
While the strike has been understudied, the intersection of Mardi Gras and politics has been written about. Two
prominent examples include Reid Mitchell’s All on a Mardi Gras Day: Episodes in the History of New Orleans
Carnival, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) and James Gill’s Lords of Misrule: Mardi Gras and the
Politics of Race in New Orleans, (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1997).
20
Preston C. Rodrigue, “The New Orleans Police Strike, 8 February to 4 March 1979” (MA thesis, Southeastern
Louisiana University, 2000).
21
Frank Bovenkirk, “The Year Without Mardi Gras,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 20 no. 1 (1993): 54.
22
Donald A. Hoffman "The New Orleans Police Strike." The Municipal Attorney (July-August 1979): 121-3.; City
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The 1977 Mayoral Election
The man under the most pressure leading up to the strike was the recently elected mayor,
Ernest Nathan “Dutch” Morial. At age 48, Morial had been sworn into office on May 1, 1978, as
New Orleans’ first black mayor. A self-identified member of the Creole of Color community, his
light complexion would have allowed him to be mistaken as a white man, but he embraced his
African-American identity and built a career as a civil rights lawyer. Working alongside civil
rights lawyer A.P. Tureaud, Morial had inherited a legacy of Creole legal activism. That legacy
stretched as far back as the eighteenth century and included Creole luminaries such as Rodolphe
Desdunes and Louis Martinet.23

Figure 2. Ernest N. “Dutch” Morial, Photograph #1252, “Mayor Ernest N. Morial” by H.F. Baquet, Portraits/Head
Shots, Mayor Ernest N. Morial Photograph Collection

23

Arnold Hirsch, Dutch Morial: Old Creole in the New South, (New Orleans: College of Urban & Public Affairs,
University of New Orleans, 1990), 6-7.
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Morial had been an active member and president of the local NAACP, which he saw as a
political training ground, according to historian Raphael Cassimere.24 Having served on the local
NAACP Youth Council during the same period, Cassimere remembered working with Morial to
protest segregated businesses and register voters after the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In 1969,
Morial took a shot at running for an at-large seat on the city council. He was narrowly defeated
by Joseph V. DiRosa DiRosa, an ally of Mayor Victor Schiro, had previously served on the city
council.25
To win the mayoralty eight years later, Morial defeated two moderate white candidates in
an open primary and Joe DiRosa in a runoff election. Despite his meritorious career as a lawyer,
state representative, and judge, Morial’s election worried many people because he did not reach
the mayor’s office through traditional channels. There were unfounded, racially fueled worries
that a black mayor would bring ruin to the city. In response to these attitudes, Figaro ran a report
before the election about other cities that had successful black mayors.26 But a real concern for
local politicians was how Morial would change New Orleans’ political system. As professor and
political analyst Charles Chai observed, Morial seemed to be outside of the local political
mainstream.27 He did not arise through a patronage-dealing political machine. Furthermore, he
was uninterested in the political practice of accommodating white leaders in the way that black
politicians done had in the past. Established local politicians wanted to know if Morial would
cooperate with them. Would he abide by their rules? Morial later observed that his independence
had made him enemies, but was proud that he “was fairly successful…without making all those
24

Raphael Cassimere, interview by Connie Zeanah Atkinson, Eric Hardy, and George Winston, video recording,
November 20, 2003, “Contemporary New Orleans: An Oral History Project,” Midlo Center for New Orleans
Studies, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.
25
“Councilman Joseph V. DiRosa,” New Orleans Public Library, accessed June 10, 2013,
http://nutrias.org/inv/council/dirosa.htm
26
“What’s happened in L.A., Atlanta, Newark, Detroit,” Figaro, October 17, 1977.
27
“A Peek at Dr. Chai’s Blockbuster,” Figaro, November 8, 1978.
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obligations and compromising myself on anything.”28 This remark understated Morial’s level of
achievement, but reveals his pointed rejection of the path of machine politicians.
Even local black political leaders, as historian and civil rights activist Raphael Cassimere
remembers, entertained the idea of throwing in their lot with a white candidate who would return
their favor in the form of patronage rather than support Morial.29 Patronage had long been a
powerful political mechanism in Louisiana. In late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the patronage
system was strengthened as federal Great Society funds flowed into what historian Kent
Germany calls the “Soft State,” a public/private partnership that came to be controlled by a few
political organizations that received gifts in exchange for delivering voters.30 Furthermore,
according to Morial, some other black political leaders worried that the election of a black mayor
would reduce their power because a black mayor could deal directly with the black community
instead of using black leaders as liaisons.31 As Cassimere described the situation, “a lot of black
politicians were kind of caught” in a dilemma. Even though Morial’s supporters were rewarded,
Cassimere continues, “they weren’t going to get the same things from Dutch that they were
getting from white politicians.”32 Dismantling the old system could produce political casualties
on all sides.
According to Arnold Hirsch, Morial’s opponent, Joe DiRosa, “conceded the black vote
and rooted his campaign in the city’s white, working-class neighborhoods.” In fact, a few days
before the election, DiRosa campaigned door-to-door in black neighborhoods following a
damaging newspaper article. However, in light of the publication of DiRosa’s use of the terms
28

Ernest Morial, Interview with Arnold Hirsch, June 20, 1987, New Orleans, LA.
Raphael Cassimere, interview with Connie Atkinson, Eric Hardy, and George Winston, Video Recording,
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“junglebunnies” while complaining about black voter registration, the attempt to win black votes
seemed like a token effort.33 Hirsch also argues that DiRosa “employed anti-establishment
rhetoric that…struck fear into the local business community.”34 This was important because
DiRosa could not afford to lose white voters. To his voting core, he “played on fears of a black
‘takeover.’” Interestingly, while some whites didn’t want to vote for Morial because of his race,
some upper class whites hesitated to back DiRosa because of his Italian ethnicity.35 Given the
choice between DiRosa and Morial, 97% of black voters chose Morial, as did 20% of whites,
including many wealthy uptown voters.
The small, yet significant, number of white votes received by Morial garnered a lot of
attention. Hirsch contends that many of the whites who voted for Morial envisioned themselves
as “kingmakers” because Morial could not have won based on black votes alone since black
voters made up a minority of registered voters.36 Frank Friedler, the city councilperson for a
district that included the wealthy uptown neighborhoods around Audubon Park, sent Morial a
thinly veiled message. The same week that Morial was sworn in as mayor, Friedler told
journalist Iris Kelso that Dutch should “admit the debt he owes to Moon,” in reference to Moon
Landrieu, the previous mayor of New Orleans.37 Friedler had supported Morial in the election
and had high praise for him. However, he repeatedly remarked to Kelso that the new black
mayor should be grateful for political groundwork laid by Landrieu, who had introduced many
African-Americans into city government. In one instance, Frielder added that Morial would
never be able to be a better mayor than Landrieu had been. Friedler bluntly conveyed the idea

33
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that Morial owed a debt to the established white politicians who believed they had helped him
get elected.
Even though some established politicians wanted to dictate to Morial, the notion of taking
a back seat to anyone was not the new mayor’s style. Morial thought he had his own coalition of
voters. Furthermore, despite some concerns about the loyalty of parts of his coalition, he felt that
since the people elected him, he held a mandate to be a powerful, active leader.38 Several months
later, Kelso was noting that Friedler had “gotten scarcely a thank you” from Morial and had
taken to opposing the mayor in the city council.39 Clearly, Morial did not want anyone to tell him
how to do his job, even if it would cost him an ally on a city council in which seven of nine
members were white.
Morial enjoyed overwhelming support amongst the general black population, but after his
election, Morial also received criticism from black political leaders for keeping many white
department heads from the previous administration. Tom Dent, a writer and figure in the Black
Arts movement, complained that Morial “didn’t act like a black man.”40 Carl Galmon, an African
American civil rights activist, resigned his post in disgust over Morial’s appointments. In
Morial’s own view, he opened the doors of all city offices to black officials, but he refused to
simply appoint black officials for the sake of their skin color. Historian Arnold Hirsch sees his
emphasis on qualification, not skin color, as an attempt “to transcend race by sheer force of his
own will.”41 In contrast to Moon Landrieu’s attempt to “make up for past unfairness,” Morial’s
personal secretary and long-time City Hall employee Alicia Davis characterized Morial’s
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approach as “let’s be fair, but let’s be fair to everybody.”42 This idealistic, egalitarian approach
disappointed both black and white politicians in a system steeped in patronage.
Many wondered whether Morial might be a one-term mayor. Hank Braden, leader of a
local black political organization called Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP),
opined that he saw “Dutch Morial tearing this community apart in every way imaginable.”43
Braden was seething because he felt Morial had deliberately removed COUP members from City
Hall. Worse, COUP leaders felt Morial had publicly embarrassed them when police raided a
reading center run by COUP, charged 27 employees with payroll fraud, and led arrestees away in
handcuffs in front of the media.44 Walking into an already difficult situation, Morial found that
his ties to many of his political allies were tenuous, and he had no shortage of enemies. It wasn’t
clear that Morial had the backing to get anything done.

A Tumultuous First Year: A Budget Crisis and a Strike
Compounding Morial’s issues, he had inherited a difficult situation from Moon Landrieu.
For one, the city possessed a particularly dour financial situation that loomed over the debate
regarding the 1979 city budget, which the mayor had to get approved by the city council. The
city sorely lacked the funds required to provide basic services. Morial told the council that the
city needed $43 million to maintain its 1978 service level or, as Morial put it, “just to stand

42
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still.”45 Squarely placing the blame on the mayors and council members who had come before
him, Morial summed up the budget situation in an address to the council:

To those who ask why this crisis came upon us at this point in time, I respond that
it has been with us for years. New Orleans has been in a state of perennial crisis
because it is the most underfinanced of all Southern cities. Almost alone among
Southern cities, we have allowed the legend to flourish that we can run a modern
city at little cost to ourselves.46

Federal funding, Morial noted, had kept the city afloat in previous years, but that funding
had begun to disappear in 1978 under the Carter presidential administration. The mayor
suggested that the city would have to “rid the government of wasteful and inefficient practices.”
47

On the other hand, he added that he wanted to increase the salaries of the police and firemen to

reflect national averages. City Hall was soon embroiled in a vigorous debate over budgets,
salaries and benefits packages, and the Mayor found himself under attack.
Just as Morial had warned in his address to the City Council, funding city services
became the major issue as he and the city council attempted to finalize the city budget for 1979.
The largest debate was over a lingering issue: changes in city employee pay. The employees
received comfortable benefits but very little pay. However, pay raises during the previous
Landrieu administration had made “the benefits begin to look like abuses,” in the eyes of some
citizens.48 The need to reform the pay structure had long been known, but until Morial took
office, the city’s administrations had avoided significant action on the issue.
Two plans for employee raises were submitted to the Civil Service Commission and were
subject to approval by the city council. Theoretically, the mayor’s office did not possess the
45
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power to change pay plans although public discussion often focused on the mayor’s stances. The
administration’s plan proposed raising employees’ salaries by 5%. The City Employee
Commission, a coalition of city workers, blasted Morial’s plan as deceptive because the 5% pay
increase was overshadowed by a proposed increase in work hours per week, from 35 to 40.49
Furthermore, the employees complained that Morial’s plan reduced the rate at which they could
accrue sick and annual leave and abolished a tenure award program. Unsurprisingly, they
proposed a larger increase than the administration, arguing that city workers should receive a
15% pay raise. The city simply lacked the funds to meet employees’ pay increase demands
without firing workers.
That fall, Morial introduced a set of revenue measures to attempt to alleviate some of the
pressure. Morial’s plan had to win the approval of the city council. The taxes, which featured a
number of small service charge increases and increases in property taxes, were met with
skepticism. Some felt the taxes were misguided because, as councilman Sidney Barthelemy
pointed out, a one-cent sales tax increase would have accomplished the same goals.50 An
editorial in the Louisiana Weekly accused Morial of using the tax plan to hedge his bets.
Although the taxes appeared to be an effort to fix the city’s problems, the Weekly suggested that
“whatever the council does with the proposals, Mayor Morial can always fall back on the cliché,
‘I tried.’”51 Despite criticism, Morial campaigned for the measures in public meetings around the
city and even gained endorsements of his plan from city civic groups such as the Metropolitan
Crime Commission.52 Ultimately, the city council wound up approving the lean budget as well as
three of the proposed taxes, which earned Morial praise. In the eyes of the Louisiana Weekly,
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“the Mayor’s public campaign to get people to put pressure on their councilmen…apparently
worked.”53 Morial had angered some city officials and media members, but the combination of
his campaigning and the support of established groups proved to be sufficient. Even a hostile city
council had not been able to derail his budget plans.
Public service workers thought they were getting a raw deal from city administration, and
various city departments began to discuss the possibility of striking. This discussion was not an
uncommon one for public workers in the seventies. In fact, Morial’s administration had already
dealt with a three-day sanitation strike in July 1978, when sanitation workers, unsanctioned by
their Teamsters’ affiliated local, walked off the job because Morial’s sanitation director had fired
a union steward.54 Observers knew that conditions were ripe for a strike, and in December 1978,
Firefighters’ Union Local No. 632 kicked off public discussion of a strike during Mardi Gras.
Though they never struck, the firefighter’s union’s threats foreshadowed later police union
action. The Firefighters’ demands were similar to those issued by PANO a few months later.
Chapter president Clarence J. Perez demanded a 15% pay increase and a 40-hour work week and
threatened to strike during carnival season.55 When asked about handling grievances in court,
Perez responded “To hell with the courts, we’ll just hit the bricks.”56 This attitude reflected a
shift in the 1970’s in internal union philosophy from diplomatic styled negotiations controlled by
the union hierarchy to rank and file control and action.57 Later on, PANO leadership would show
a similar distaste for contractual litigation, instead favoring job action.
While any strike by emergency responders was sure to put the Morial administration in a
tough position, the firefighters sought to press the city’s leaders by threatening to endanger one
53
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of the city’s best known cultural and economic events. By 1979, Mardi Gras “supported a yearround industry of manufacturing or importing supplies and accessories.”58 Business people and
their employees had come to rely on an uptick in revenue during Mardi Gras as tourists poured
dollars into local hotels, bars, restaurants, and anything else they might need to pay for during
their stay. Many business owners counted on the revenue boost provided by visitors seeking the
carefree indulgence and spectacle of Mardi Gras. While the carnival season may seem chaotic on
the street, the parades actually require a coordinated effort by public services and private
organizations known as krewes. Firefighters, but more importantly the police, are integral to the
success of parades that travel for several miles past thick crowds lining both sides of the street.
Monitoring vehicle traffic and enforcing street closures along the lengthy parade routes as well
as ensuring that spectators avoid getting too close to floats and bands required almost all police
personnel to work overtime hours, especially in the last two weeks of the season. The potential
danger of fire during one of the parades would require the police and fire departments working in
tandem. The firefighters knew, as did all emergency personnel, that their value was highest
during Mardi Gras, so that would be when they could enjoy the most leverage.
This tactic had been tried before by a different group of workers connected to Mardi
Gras. In the late 1940’s, flambeaux carriers, African-American men who carried torches to light
the night parades, walked out in protest of poor treatment by the white-dominated carnival
establishment who hired them.59 The strike merged civil rights activism with economic protest.
Though not public servants, their resistance proved the tactic to be fruitful. They managed to
force the parade organizations to, in some cases, double their wages, as krewe captains and local
Mardi Gras boosters worried the flambeaux presence was part of the experience that visitors had
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come to expect. The flambeaux had successfully used Mardi Gras to accomplish a political goal.
Three decades later, Mardi Gras had been further cultivated as a tourist attraction, so targeting it
was a logical choice. One officer would later describe the threat of striking during Mardi Gras as
the police union’s “four aces.”60
Soon the Police Association of New Orleans (PANO) began to echo the Firefighters’
Union’s ominous talk about job action during carnival season. Founded in 1969, the Police
Association was a relative newcomer compared to the 40-year-old Firefighters’ union and the
50-year-old local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). PANO had, in part, been
founded because some officers felt that the FOP did not represent the needs of younger members
of the force. Exposing a sense of tension between FOP and PANO, in 1969, spokesperson Judge
Joseph R. Bosetta dismissed officers who were unsatisfied with the FOP as “a little on the greedy
side.”61 This was, in part, because the FOP was prohibited from striking by its constitution.
PANO reflected a trend in labor in the 1970’s towards stronger, more active public worker
unions. A few years later, in 1973, 23 of the department’s 83 black officers created the New
Orleans chapter of the Black Organization of Police, affiliated with the National Black Police
Association, which advocated for fair treatment for black police.62 During this period, unions
experienced a strong push for control by rank and file members. PANO’s creation stemmed from
frustration with the existing order. Furthermore, as Jefferson Cowie demonstrates in Stayin’
Alive, American union members during this period were pulled from many different directions.
This was true for New Orleans’ police unions as their 1979 strike experience would prove that
racial and bureaucratic conflicts distracted from working class consciousness.
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PANO grew rapidly, from fourteen original officers to 750 members in just four months.
According to the PANO’s website, “PANO was founded out of frustration due to poor working
conditions, substandard pay, low morale, and lack of attention to the backbone of the New
Orleans Police Department, the patrolmen and sergeants.” Their claims were not unfounded; the
NOPD’s working conditions were very poor and officers often moonlighted or worked exorbitant
amounts of overtime. A 1976 study showed NOPD officers were working an average of 500 to
600 overtime hours per year—more than twice the next leading department in the nation — to
make ends meet.63 Their earliest list of demands consisted of a number of equipment upgrades,
pay upgrades and civil service reforms.64 In 1973, after “three years and over 100 bargaining
sessions,” PANO signed a three-year collective bargaining agreement with the city.65 Originally
an AFL-CIO affiliate, PANO decided to join the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in
1976, citing the AFL-CIO’s reluctance to pressure the city.66 According to PANO president
Vincent Bruno, this change did not reflect the AFL-CIO’s weakness but it appeared to observers
that PANO sought a national organization that was willing to negotiate more aggressively with
the city.67 The decision came just a week after the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s deputies had also
opted to join the Teamsters, though it took PANO until January 1978 to officially become a
member of the Teamsters.68
Some citizens had been sympathetic to the police department’s low pay and poor morale,
but others also saw the police through a different lens—that of police brutality. Sociologist
Joseph Fichter’s 1964 report on the NOPD’s treatment of arrestees described a history of racial
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prejudice and illegal police behavior.69 In the 1970’s, eports of police brutality still surfaced
frequently. The victims mostly consisted of black citizens whom police harassed, beat, and even
sexually abused.70 The officers were mostly white, though it wasn’t unheard of for black officers
to be accused of brutality. Furthermore, on average between 1975 and 1979, NOPD officers
killed more civilians per officer than any other American police force.71 Morial had personally
experienced abusive police officers when NOPD officers had arrested him for “refusing to move
on” while standing in front of his home in 1968.72 The NOPD clearly stood in the way of the
kind of open society Morial envisioned, and he had sought to reform the police as one of his first
orders of business.
First, the mayor needed to find a replacement for the outgoing police superintendent. The
search began before Morial’s inauguration when he assigned a 29-person task force to select
candidates from which the mayor could choose. Morial intended to send a positive message
about the future of the NOPD by conducting the search openly and with representation from all
over the city. The selection of James Parsons, from Birmingham, Alabama, wound up angering
NOPD officers who had expected one of their own to be elevated to superintendent instead.
Parsons had helped reform the Birmingham Police and had, according to Morial, a “reputation at
that time for being one of the outstanding police administrators in the country.”73 Parsons had
been instrumental in the reformation of a police force in Birmingham that had become legendary
for its racism and brutality under police chief Bull Connor. To Morial, Parsons seemed like the
right kind of person to help Morial take on one his biggest challenges, but Parsons was
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immediately labeled as an outsider by many NOPD officers. Morial and Parsons set out to try to
reform the department’s crime reporting, behavior, and racial makeup. These major changes
were unpopular with many officers. This was especially true for “a core of veteran white officers
who did little to hide their distaste” for someone that they described as the “nigger mayor.”74 A
conflict was lurking and the pay problems, while not illegitimate, provided a pretext to challenge
the new mayor.
Threatening to strike was nothing new for NOPD officers. Almost immediately after its
creation, PANO began to experiment with strike tactics. In 1969, PANO and the Firefighters’
Union collaborated in a sick-out, or “Blue Flu” and “Red Flu,” during the general election to
which the city responded by sending doctors to police officers’ homes in the middle of the night
to check the officers’ health.75 The police were met with angry words from police superintendent
Joseph Giarrusso who accused the officers of breaking their commitment to the public. By 1979,
the officers in PANO had experience with union activity and had threatened to strike in 1976.76
However, they had never carried out a strike of the length that union leaders began to publicly
talk about in late 1978 and early 1979. PANO’s opposition to Morial was known since it had
supported DiRosa in the 1977 mayoral race.77
The most visible member of PANO was Vincent Bruno, its 31-year-old president of
PANO, Bruno was born in July 1946 and he became a police officer at 20 years of age. He was
related by marriage to reputed New Orleans crime boss Carlos Marcello and the two apparently
kept in close touch; Bruno visited regularly at Marcello’s home in Metairie, a suburb of New
Orleans. Bruno became the PANO president after the organization’s first presient, Irving Magri,
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lost his police job in 1975 for publicly calling the police superintendent at the time, Clarence
Giarrusso, a “liar” and a “coward” during a squabble between PANO and the city.78 Bruno would
also express himself bluntly to the media, which would eventually lead to Morial describing him
as a “rabble rouser.”
With pressure to negotiate mounting and only three weeks before Mardi Gras Day,
Morial chose the FOP, not PANO, as the only bargaining agent the city would recognize. Morial
appeared at a press conference with FOP’s William Roth, who skirted reporters’ questions about
his organization’s aims, to announce the administration’s decision.79 That night Bruno
denounced Morial’s selection of the FOP as a “deceptive and insulting public relations ploy.”80
He pointed out that the FOP lacked the ability to strike according to its constitution. Morial had
argued that negotiations between the administration and the police would not touch wages or
working conditions because those issues fell under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. Bruno interpreted Morial’s actions as an attempt to add a veneer of good faith
bargaining while declawing angry PANO members. PANO had been recognized by the city as an
official bargaining agent just a few years earlier. Furthermore, PANO had 710 members while
the FOP had 647, though many officers belonged to both organizations. As journalist Paul
Atkinson pointed out, the power to strike still lay in the hands of individual police officers who
could make a choice to strike regardless of which organization was deemed the official
bargaining agent.81 In other words, taking job action might be a way for officers to short circuit
the city’s negotiating tactics.
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Dutch Morial’s attempt to dismiss PANO by choosing to negotiate with the FOP was an
important turning point. While the police had initially been concerned about issues that affected
all city workers, they now felt like the mayor had betrayed them. It appeared that Morial’s
recognition ploy had been a blunder. Bruno said the police and the Teamsters felt they had been
pushed “to the wall” and threats began to fly.82 Sanitation workers, also angry over the loss of
fringe benefits, had agreed on February 7 that they would strike on Monday, February 12 at
12:01 AM if the city had failed to reinstate vacation and sick leave benefits which had been
cancelled.83 Bruno claimed that PANO leadership already possessed the authority to call a strike
but would still wait until a meeting could be held. After a hearing in which the Civil Service
Commission made it clear that those benefits would not be restored, a strike seemed inevitable.
The night of February 8, about 300 of PANO’s members met to formalize a strike effective
immediately. At this stage, with less than two weeks to negotiate before the real tourist bonanza
began, the strike certainly did not mean that Mardi Gras was doomed. Nonetheless, the decision
to strike showed that PANO was willing to back up its threats.

Figure 3. Striking officers speak to Superintendent Parsons (far left) during the first strike, photo by Gerry
Lodriguss, The Times-Picayune, February 10, 1979.
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Unlike Superintendent Joseph Giarrusso during the Blue Flu of 1969, Superintendent
Parsons communicated his sympathy for the striking officers and even visited a picket line while
encouraging officers to end their strike.84 Despite this mild response from the police chief,
striking potentially exposed officers to a major risk: the administration had threatened that failing
to show up for work may lead to job termination. Officers faced a tough decision. Linda Strata,
the wife of an officer, sent a letter to Morial’s office describing the choice that her husband
faced. Actually addressed to Mayor Morial’s wife, Sybil, Strata wrote that her husband was “torn
between the Oath he took and the 11 years of frustrations and the belief in what he is doing.”85
Mrs. Strata complimented Morial, but made it clear that previous mayors had mistreated the
police. Sitting alone while remaining at work at central lockup, Sergeant John Taylor III, told a
reporter, “I want to be out there…but I don’t believe police should strike. My heart’s out there
but my body’s in here…It tears you, it really tears you.”86 To add to officers’ fears, rumors
suggested that Morial’s administration might jump at the chance to clean house in the NOPD and
attempt to build a more racially diverse force with new recruits.87 This rumor was
unsubstantiated, but it certainly would have played on some white officers’ fears of a black
“takeover.” Joining the strike posed less of a problem for others; as one anonymous officer told
reporters, “I ain’t got nothing now, so why should I worry about being fired?”88
The February 8 strike order no doubt concerned Morial, but city officials publicly
championed a contingency plan that went into effect when PANO struck. The plan, hatched with
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the help of Governor Edwin Edwards, sent the Louisiana National Guard as well as State Police
to New Orleans to serve with the officers who had chosen not to strike.89
After just two days, on February 10, the police were back on the job. Despite professing
confidence in the contingency plan, the administration agreed to recommend that the Civil
Service Commission restore the lost fringe benefits to city workers. This move mollified
sanitation workers whose February 12 strike deadline had not yet passed. PANO received even
more concessions. Mayor Morial agreed to recognize PANO as the official representative for
rank-and-file police officers after the FOP voluntarily relinquished its role as bargaining agent.90
Furthermore, the administration agreed that it would not take revenge on strikers. The agreement
ended the strike temporarily, but nothing was finalized as the city entered into emergency
negotiations with PANO. At the 1:40 a.m. announcement of the agreement on February 10, Iris
Kelso noted that Morial looked exhausted, “his voice was wooden,” and he “was not the cocky,
arrogant man he had been.”91 PANO and Teamsters leaders seized the offensive; Mitchell Ledet,
secretary-treasurer of Teamster Local No. 270 and one of the main negotiators, warned “We
don’t play for fun – we play for keeps.” Bruno, in his typically colorful style, celebrated: “Man,
we done brought ‘em to their knees, man, you understand that?”92 He was right; the union had
forced Morial to retreat.
As city officials acquiesced to a list of demands, the police and their Teamster negotiators
began to appear greedy to local politicians. Councilman Mike Early pointedly asked after a week
of fruitless negotiations: “Where does the ante stop? The ante started out with two demands, it
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went up to three, it went up to four, it went up to five. Where do we draw the line?”93 One of the
mayor’s top aides, Reynard Rochon, insisted “We’ve been telling them that there’s no more
blood in the turnip.”94 Opposition to the police union had brought Morial’s administration and
the city council—two usually antagonistic forces—together, if only temporarily.
With the police back at work pending an agreement, PANO asked for assistance from the
Teamsters. In a move that would have far-reaching ramifications, Teamster officials sent Joseph
Valenti of Detroit to New Orleans to help negotiate with the city. One scholar speculated that
PANO preferred to deal with a white Teamster official rather than local teamster leader Mitch
Ledet, who was black.95 However, Bruno and Valenti remember wholly different reasoning
behind the decision. According to Preston Rodrigue’s thesis, Valenti recalled that PANO felt
Ledet was too friendly with Morial while Bruno reported that Ledet and Morial had a strong
dislike for each other.96 Regardless, Ledet’s replacement had established a successful record in
negotiating on behalf of public sector union locals. Despite such credentials, Valenti proved
incapable of surpassing Ledet’s earlier victory over the mayor and his staff.
Valenti, from Teamsters Local #214 in Detroit, presented a resumé of helping public
workers unionize around the country.97 He had worked with sanitation workers in Detroit and he
had helped unionize a small-town police department near Tampa. The Times-Picayune
introduced Valenti to the public in a short article, calling him a “tough negotiator who will travel
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anywhere, anytime to help any group organize, as long as the group talking is the Teamsters.”98
The Picayune also underscored the fact that in 1975, Valenti had provided crucial testimony in
the investigation of the disappearance of Teamster leader Jimmy Hoffa. Though Valenti had not
been accused of anything, the article seemed more intent on exploring his relation to organized
crime than his relation to the strike at hand. The police found that they had acquired more than
just Valenti’s expertise.

Figure 4. Joseph Valenti, staff photo by Bryan S. Bertaux, in The Times-Picayune, February 19, 1979.

Negotiations between administration and the union representatives were tense, and both
sides used the local media to appeal to the citizens.. Valenti drew heavy criticism as anti-strike
politicians depicted him as a crook and an outsider. Interestingly, attacks did not center on
Vincent Bruno’s known relation to well-known New Orleans mob boss Carlos Marcello. Instead,
by focusing on Valenti’s status as an “outsider,” anti-strike forces employed an old tactic that
had long been used against union and civil rights organizers. In a major show of support for
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Morial, the New Orleans City Council lashed out at Valenti and the Teamsters. Council President
and former Police Superintendent Joseph Giarrusso claimed Valenti “has issued threats to
destroy the city and has put himself in a position above the people’s elected officials.”99
Giarrusso chose to pin the blame almost solely on Valenti, adding that “responsible New Orleans
police are being duped and deceived” by an outsider who “has no stake in this community.”100
Giarrusso, whose political success had stemmed from his decades of leadership in the New
Orleans Police Department, seemed especially careful not to directly offend the rank and file
officers. Morial also traced a connection between unions and outsiders, saying that union leaders
from other places “don’t understand anything about the inner workings of our city.”101 Later, he
told reporter Norman Robinson that agreeing to binding arbitration, which the union demanded,
would be “like letting someone from New York, Chicago, or Philadelphia come in and tell you
what your taxes should be.” Such rhetoric seems similar to the stance taken by government
officials fending off labor and civil rights movement campaigns.102
The union negotiators fired back at Morial. Vincent Bruno told reporters that the Morial
administration had the ball now, “and once more they’re fumbling.”103 When pressed to explain
why, Bruno said “I think we have, uh, some people in the city that, uh, don’t have the proper
attitude…I think that some people in city government have too much pride and they’d rather let
that stand in the way of the safety of the citizens.” Bruno’s choice of words echoed the white
politicians and political commentators who referenced Morial’s arrogance and pride at his
election to needle his independence as a black politician. Some of the negotiator’s statements did
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not seem to carry a racial charge, but were simply threats. Morial told reporters after one
negotiating session that a union official had told him that a strike would yield “no winners—only
a chewed up survivor.”104 Valenti later told reporters that a strike could be avoided if “the
dingbat can come around,” referring to Morial.105

Figure 5. Joseph Valenti (left) and Vincent Bruno(right center), AP Photo, The Baton Rouge Advocate, February 17,
1979.

Nonetheless, union officials refused to settle, and on Friday, February 16, 11 days before
Mardi Gras Day, the police struck for the second time. Some doubted that the police would get
what they wanted. Fifteen-year veteran and PANO member Tom Rainer, though he sympathized
with the NOPD, said “You can’t beat city hall. It’s been true for so many years. Now they’re
putting on their boxing gloves and they’re going to see.”106 While Rainer’s reticence seems
prudent in hindsight, at the time the strikers appeared to hold the upper hand because of the
looming threat to Mardi Gras. Striking officers formed picket lines around precinct headquarters
and held rallies. Eventually, police strikers formed picket lines around garbage depots and trash
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collection stopped as the sanitation workers, whose union was also affiliated with the Teamsters,
honored the police lines.107 Their rallies were often rambunctious scenes featuring “rock and
disco music” where “the beer and hot dogs flowed freely.”108 More ominously, striking officers
held a mock funeral for the officers who did not strike, pinning a list of their names to a casket.
One officer told a reporter, “They know their time will come. If they couldn’t come out and
support us, we won’t support them.”109
Over one thousand National Guard troops and Louisiana State Police headed to New
Orleans to assume the NOPD’s duties for a second time. Their previous stint had gone smoothly,
with no noticeable change in criminal activity. Still, their ability to handle police duty for a long
period of time remained a major concern for city officials and citizens alike, especially if they
were called upon to handle Mardi Gras parades. Governor Edwin Edwards conceded “no other
group of men and women in the world are as capable of handling Mardi Gras as the New Orleans
police.”110 Mayor Morial decided to cancel the first weekend of parades, but held off on making
a decision about Mardi Gras Day and the final weekend when the most prominent parades were
scheduled to take to the streets.

107

“Orleans Police Reject Offer, Vow Escalation,” The Baton Rouge Advocate, February 23, 1979.
Alan Citron, “‘We’ll Win,’ Bruno Vows to Picketing Policemen,” The Times-Picayune, February 26, 1979.
109
Ibid.
110
Woody Baird, “Edwards Asks N.O., Police Union to Wait Until After Mardi Gras,” The Baton Rouge Advocate,
February 15, 1979.
108

31

Figure 6. Members of the Louisiana National Guard who had been called to New Orleans to provide security during
the second police strike. Many of the members of National Guard had never seen Mardi Gras before. Photo by Chris
Harris, published in Figaro, Febuary 26, 1978.

Besides the prospect of losing Mardi Gras parades and tourist revenue, the threat of
lawlessness, real or imagined, scared some citizens. Many New Orleanians had already made it
clear that crime weighed heavily on their minds even before the strike. Mostly the result of
improved crime reporting within the NOPD, crime statistics had jumped during Morial’s first
year. The striking police officers were happy to use those statistics to fuel citizens’ fears, and
early in the strike PANO placed a quarter-page warning in The Times-Picayune. It read “we feel
a sense of duty and obligation to warn you of possible danger to you, your family and your
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property” and cited the previous month’s homicide statistics: 30 murders in 31 days.111 Those in
the city’s camp no doubt felt this warning read more like a threat. Further raising tension, David
Duke, grand wizard of one branch of the Ku Klux Klan, also added an ominous element of
uncertainty when he announced the Klan would send patrols to New Orleans to “report crime
and protect citizens” for the duration of the strike.112 Duke added that the Klan supported the
police union’s decisions. Furthermore, cross burnings were reported in New Orleans East.113
How would a descent into lawlessness and the presence of KKK street patrols reflect on the city
while the nation turned its eyes to New Orleans during Mardi Gras?

Figure 7. A warning letter to the citizens of New Orleans from the striking police, published in The Times-Picayune,
February 17, 1979.

111

The Times-Picayune, February 17, 1979.
“KKK Patrol Announced if Police Strike,” The Times-Picayune, February 15, 1979.
113
“Black Officers To Go ‘Back on the Job,’” The Louisiana Weekly, February 2, 1979.
112

33

The Court of Public Opinion

Figure 8. “If It Sinks We All Go Down!” The Times-Picayune, February 16, 1979.

Public opinion about the strike remained varied. Almost everyone lamented the potential
for a year without Mardi Gras, but some people could relate to union demands. One citizen told
The Times-Picayune “I have three cousins on the force and they need to make more money. But
if they love the city they could wait until after Mardi Gras.”114 Another told a reporter “every
man has a right to make a decent wage, whether he is in public sector or private.”115 Others had
less sympathy of striking officers, criticizing them as “selfish” and going “a little too far…on
purpose.”116 Morial drew blame from some citizens who thought he was arrogant and stubborn.
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Understandably, the business community had much to say about the strike. Seventeen
French Quarter business owners started an unsuccessful petition to recall the mayor.117 Speaking
for the group, Alton Tubbs focused on the material losses of a cancelled Mardi Gras. Tubbs told
a reporter “I’ve got $5,000 of inventory for Mardi Gras. What am I supposed to do with it?”
Another member of the group, Allan Jones, who owned three massage parlors and seventeen
vending carts, told a reporter that he relied on the Carnival revenue just to pay rent every year.
Not all outlooks were as dire; tour organizer Harvey MacLean told reporters a week before
Mardi Gras that “in short, it’s all systems go” and he complained that national news coverage of
the strike was misleading to tourists.118 Clearly, all of these business people had reasons to invest
in a particular view of the strike. Some, such as Jones and Tubbs, wanted to pressure the
administration to end the strike while others wanted to keep tourists from avoiding the city. In
the end, one of the most important numbers used to assess the success of Mardi Gras would be
related to hotel occupancy. But, at least according to local hoteliers who no doubt feared mass
room cancellations, the number of reservations remained normal a little over a week before
Mardi Gras Day.119
Despite attacks on his job performance, Morial still had plenty of supporters as the strike
wore on, many of whom saw Morial as a hero of the anti-unionist cause. His office received
letters from all around Louisiana and as far away as Nashua, New Hampshire, and Tempe,
Arizona, that condemned what they saw as union greed. Morial even received a letter from U.S.
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who urged Morial to oppose “a relative handful of union bosses
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seizing control of America’s government.”120 Along with his letter, Helms included a pamphlet
for the Americans Against Union Control of Government, an anti-union lobbying group.
Ironically, Helms, a Republican conservative who had disagreed with federal enforcement of
integration, chose to support Morial, the first African-American graduate of LSU Law School
and a noted civil rights lawyer.
Helms wasn’t the only unnatural ally to send Morial words of encouragement. Several
members of the old New Orleans establishment wrote to Morial. Darwin C. and Darwin S.
Fenner, sent Morial a telegram urging him to maintain his stance vis-à-vis the union. 121 Gerald
Andrus, a former King of Rex and successful business executive, wrote that he “would prefer to
give up the celebration this year rather than have the city strangled for years by an unreasonable
contract with a union.”122 Some citizens who wrote to the mayor went even further. For example,
Mr. and Mrs. Borne Boudreaux urged the mayor to “"continue to hold your ground for our sake
and do not let the Teamster Mobsters take over our wonderful and great city.”123 Not
infrequently, citizens described the strike as part of a larger Teamster, and potentially mafia,
push for control of the city and even the country. Morial’s friend, social activist Russell
Henderson, remembered “the police strike was about…the Mafia, which was running the police
union.”124 As the strike remained unresolved, the rhetoric about mobsters began to include
reference to local as well as outside sources of organized crime. In addition to Valenti, critics of
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the police union could also point to the known connection between local crime boss Carlos
Marcello and Vincent Bruno. Not only were they related by marriage, but the Times-Picayune
suggested that Marcello might gain clout if PANO were to prevail.125 Even conservatives who
might have opposed Morial during his election because of racist attitudes could find common
ground with him regarding the strike.
In a city sometimes accused of being overly preoccupied with race, newspaper writers
conspicuously stayed away from questioning PANO’s racial motives. However, when citizens
were asked about the strike, some noted Morial’s detractors might have racial motivations.
Lucille Spears, a house sitter, told the paper that “they are taking advantage of a black mayor.”126
Regina Joseph, a disabled worker, echoed that sentiment arguing that “people are just picking on
him since he’s the first black mayor.”127 Gustave Thomas, head of BOP and president of the local
NAACP chapter, reported that he heard a white officer rejoice in Morial’s defeat during the first
strike, referring to the mayor by a racial slur.128 Morial confirmed their suspicions several years
later when he told Dr. Huey L. Perry that he felt “very strongly that it was an effort to test the
will of a black mayor by a white dominated police department.” Speaking in 2003, Russell
Henderson, remembered that there were “Klan people in the union.”129 Furthermore, though not
a large group, the Black Organization of Police ordered its members to go back to work, and
reported that about half of its 80 officers never struck in the first place.130 The motivation of the
black officers who did strike is unknown, but considering the intimidation tactics used at PANO
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rallies, it is certainly possible that both black and white officers felt they had no choice but to go
along.
The ranks of anti-strikers swelled when Vincent Bruno’s colorful speech led to a major
public relations gaffe. “If the talks break down,” he threatened 8 days before Mardi Gras Day,
“cave ‘em in, wreck the city.”131 While he later apologized, his statement did major damage to
the union’s image. Joseph Valenti also botched a public statement, accidentally referring to the
replacement police as Michigan State Police and National Guards.132 Many citizens took these
mistakes as proof that the union leaders didn’t care about the city.

Getting Rid of the “Hostage”
A week before Mardi Gras day, on February 20, the captains of 18 carnival organizations
met at the Howard Johnson hotel across the street from City Hall to discuss the future of Mardi
Gras in 1979. In what Iris Kelso would later call “the outcome nobody could have predicted,” the
krewe captains issued a joint statement announcing that they would be cancelling the remaining
parades.133 “It is wrong to use Mardi Gras as blackmail in this dispute,” they wrote, “nothing but
harm can come to the spirit of New Orleans Mardi Gras through the day-by-day suspense of
cancellation, dependent on the final judgment of out-of-town union leaders.”134 Brooke Duncan,
captain of the exclusive Krewe of Rex, added that he wanted negotiators “to know they couldn’t
hold Mardi Gras hostage.”135
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Parade captains and city officials cited safety as the main concern behind cancelling
parades, but the move also drastically changed the balance of power between the administration
and the strikers. Not everyone saw the krewe’s decision to support Morial coming. According to
Alicia Davis, Morial’s secretary, the people in Morial’s office did not know what the krewe
captains’ decision was going to be until they came to City Hall in person to tell the mayor.136 In
hindsight, there may have been signs that the krewes would align themselves the way that they
did. Alicia Davis connected the decision to an annual luncheon that the mayor first held for the
krewe captains in November 1978 which helped the captains get to know Morial. Iris Kelso had
covered the event, joking that Morial was turning into an “establishment mayor,” because he had
worn a tie that matched those of the upper crust of society.137 More seriously, Kelso noted that
this meeting was a sign that Morial and the social and economic elite were building a working
relationship, however unsteady. Additionally, Teamster attorney John Ormand had remarked
days before the krewe captains’ big decision that bad feelings between PANO and the wealthy
business community had been “festering.”138 The parade captains’ statement made their
opposition to the unions clear. Vincent Bruno’s remarks about wrecking the city were apparently
a major subject of discussion.139 The captains placed blame squarely with the strike leadership
while voicing their support for Morial and the city council.
While the captains blamed the unions for the cancellation of Mardi Gras, they took
ownership of the decision. This nuance often missed in accounts of the strike. While Morial had
cancelled some of the less prestigious parades early in the parade season, the captains of the
remaining krewes voluntarily cancelled their parades. Among these krewes that paraded towards
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the end of the season were the long-established organizations populated by the highest echelon of
New Orleans’ society. In interviews, the captains made it clear that they did not act at the
mayor’s request; one captain said, “We made the decision. We ran it by the mayor but we were
not asked by him to do it.”140 While union officials suspected collaboration between the captains
and Morial, the mayor’s office confirmed that the captains had come to their decision on their
own. Local newspapers and the New York Times made this distinction in 1979, but the Wall
Street Journal did not. The distinction was important at the time because the apparently
unsolicited cancellation of parades signalled that the social elite still asserted some independence
and clout. They no longer controlled the ballot box, but they still owned Mardi Gras.
Though the strike had not ended, the City Council took out a full page advertisement in
The Times-Picayune to declare its victory over the union. In an open letter directed at Joe
Valenti, the councilmembers declared “you have imposed your Detroit Teamster tactics on the
people of New Orleans hoping that you would bring us to our knees. But, Mr. Valenti, you
miscalculated the courage and toughness of the people of New Orleans.”141 Like many previous
statements which distinguished between bad union leadership and good rank-and-file union
members, the letter extended an olive branch to the NOPD officers by acknowledging their
“many legitimate grievances of long standing” and encouraged officers to reject Teamster
assistance.142 Typical of xenophobic attacks on Valenti and the Teamsters, Councilman Frank
Friedler triumphantly announced “what they found out is this city doesn’t like outside
agitators.”143
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As Mardi Gras Day approached, carnival season continued on without its biggest
spectacle. Parades still rolled in surrounding parishes and krewes that had cancelled their parades
still held their balls behind closed doors, guarded by Louisiana National Guard or private
security companies. People flocked to the Jefferson Parish parade route, on which established
Jefferson parades were joined by a few visiting Orleans Parish parades; a New York Times
columnist reported that the Jefferson celebration featured more disco than traditional New
Orleans music.144 The Times-Picayune still described the activities of the city’s social elite in
adoring detail, presenting Rex and his queen and recapping the midnight meeting of the courts of
the Mistick Krewe of Comus and the Krewe of Rex. Bacchus, a huge, business-oriented
“superkrewe,” even paraded on the Sunday before Mardi Gras Day inside the Louisiana
Superdome, which the journalist William K. Stevens described as a “hermetically sealed megagras.”145 However, to the surprise of many, Mardi Gras Day in the French Quarter proved to be
an exciting experience as thousands of costumed people flooded the streets. In the eyes of some
locals, it was the best Carnival ever. Beads rained down on revelers as balconies “act[ed] as
replacements for the absent floats.”146 Journalist Jim Polster opined that the joyful scene in the
French Quarter was the response of locals who, as he noted they often did, felt that vaguely
defined outside forces were trying to take away their cultural traditions.
Despite the spontaneity and fun of Mardi Gras Day, tourism really did take a hit as city
leaders had worried. An estimated half of the city’s hotel rooms remained vacant during the
height of the season as would-be visitors cancelled en masse at the last minute.147 Restaurants,
bars, and vendors of all kinds suffered. Philip Guichet, owner of Tujague’s restaurant in the
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French Quarter, found his scapegoat in the labor unions, saying “I blame the Teamsters. Who
else can I blame but the police and the union?”148
Having lost almost all of their leverage, the police seemed to have little choice but to end
the strike. On March 4, the strike officially ended. The police were left empty handed as Morial,
who rescinded PANO’s official city recognition, offered nothing more than the restoration of
benefits that the police had already won after their first strike. He had little reason to offer them
anything and the officers needed to keep their jobs. One major concern for officers was whether
or not they would face punishment. Vincent Bruno told reporters that he knew he might face
repercussions, “I’ve been told numerous times I’m No. 1 on the list…but that kind of comes with
the territory.”149
Bruno, however, temporarily retained his position in the NOPD and in PANO though he
maintained an antagonistic relationship with the city. He even talked of striking again in 1980
before it became clear that PANO membership had no interest in a second try.150 At a midJanuary 1980 meeting to vote on another strike, fewer than 1 in 10 members even showed up.
The same week Bruno and Morial exchanged heated words at a fundraiser while Edwin Edwards
and Moon Landrieu “looked on in amazement.”151 The failure of the 1979 strike had dealt a
powerful blow to PANO. Less than two months after trying to call another strike in 1980,
Superintendent Parsons fired Vincent Bruno for abusing the department’s sick leave policy and
Bruno resigned the presidency of PANO. But Bruno’s political career had just begun. He went
on to be an activist in Louisiana’s Republican Party, even running for the United States House of
Representatives. Most notably he helped David Duke in Duke’s 1991 gubernatorial race as an
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unofficial religious advisor. More than once in the 1990s, Louisiana Republican candidates,
including Governors Mike Foster and David Treen, used Bruno’s connection to Duke to try to
access Duke’s supporters.152
Mayor Morial continued to pursue the improvement of the NOPD with varying results. In
1980, several members of the NOPD brutally retaliated against citizens in the Algiers
neighborhood after the murder of an officer. According to George Winston, the police allegedly
terrorized the black community where the officer had been murdered and left four citizens dead
under suspicious circumstances.153 Change, where it existed, was slow. Still, Morial later boasted
that, despite any resentment over the strike, police leadership could not deny that he had
significantly raised their pay.154 This improvement gave Morial a talking point in his reelection
campaign, but the racial issues that plagued the police department in his first term had certainly
not disappeared.155 Morial noted in 1984 that the police, whom he termed “clubby,” were the
most resistant city department with regard to allowing African-Americans into leadership
positions.156 White officers objected to quota systems intended to encourage the promotion of
black officers to better reflect the city’s population. PANO, though it had been weakened by the
strike, found funds to support officers who had been accused of brutality against black
citizens.157 In one case, PANO helped fund the legal defense of several white officers accused of
violence in the Algiers incident, while a group of black officers funded the primary witness
against the accused officers. Though Morial never cited the stubbornness of white police officers
during the strike, he connected the two while deriding the NOPD’s resistance to racial change
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during his second term. When asked by a reporter if PANO would have avoided a strike in 1979
if the mayor were white, he responded “no question about it, I’m going to write a book about
it.”158
Reforming the police department would not be Morial’s only challenge during the rest of
his time in office. Morial struggled with a defiant city council that came to be known as the
“Gang of Five.” He would also lose the support of many of the whites who had voted for him in
1977. He clashed with wealthy uptown whites over the Audubon golf club and Zoo. Russell
Henderson recalled tension at Mardi Gras in 1980 when Morial invited nationally recognized
African-American activist Jesse Jackson to view the parades with him on the mayor’s viewing
stand in front of Gallier Hall, the former city hall. Jackson’s presence angered members of the
old line Mystick Krewe of Comus, according to Henderson. In retaliation, Henderson said, the
Comus float riders took aim at Morial and started “throwing shit as hard as they could at his
head…They were literally trying to knock his head off.”159 The open hostility exhibited that night
in one of the most visible locations on Comus’ parade route showed that racial tension was still
very high after almost two years of Morial’s mayoralty.
After an unsuccessful attempt to change the city charter so he could run for a third term,
Morial was replaced by Sidney Barthelemy. Political analysts observed that election of
Barthelemy, a Creole with political roots in the organization COUP, represented a “repudiation
of Mr. Morial” because Morial had backed Barthelemy’s opponent, William Jefferson.160 Arnold
Hirsch points out that, unlike Morial, Barthelemy, who was elected with 85% of the white vote,
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offered “a ready smile, an easy going personality, and the promise that he would go along to get
along.”161

Conclusion
Morial, true to his experience as a lawyer and a judge, once pointed out that part of the
strike’s importance was that it produced a significant judicial decision in Louisiana which
disallowed strikes by Louisiana public safety workers.162 To some, the strike was significant
because it led to an unorthodox Mardi Gras celebration and a reinvigoration of street celebration.
For PANO and anti-unionists, its primary significance may have been that the strike ended in a
defeat for public unionism. But, in the context of American city politics, the strike captures a
specific instance in New Orleans history that differs from the experience of other cities. The
strike was a contest of power in a political scene changed by the civil rights movement and the
brief surge in public labor unions with the uncommon addition of Mardi Gras. Looking back 10
years to PANO’s 1969 sick-out, the city’s political landscape had changed drastically. In 1969,
Mayor Victor Schiro had been able to simply pressure PANO into submission, but things were
different in 1979 because the political landscape had changed with the addition of Dutch Morial,
an increase in the aggressiveness of public unions, a budget crisis brought on by disappearing
federal funds, and the threat to Mardi Gras. This collision of new forces created, in the words of
Iris Kelso, an “outcome nobody could have predicted.”163 For a short time, a diverse group of
interests rallied to the controversial mayor, including the city’s social elite. Racist attitudes had
not disappeared, but the weakened old social elite found a momentary ally in Morial against
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insurgent union tendencies and lower class whites. In many ways, this weakening old
establishment faced a similar choice vis-à-vis Morial as they had during his 1978 election. As
with DiRosa, the elites found Morial more palatable than his working class, anti-establishment
opponents. Morial needed the support of the krewes during the strike, too, much as he had
needed the support of civic groups during the city’s budget crisis. The alignment could not have
happened without the existence of the cultural capital of Mardi Gras. Throughout the rest of
Morial’s tenure in office, the mayor and social elites would never be as unified about another
major issue. The beads angrily hurled at Mayor Morial’s viewing stand on Mardi Gras Night in
1980 by New Orleans’ most prominent krewe demonstrated how fleeting that alliance had been.
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